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Abstract
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detail that underlines his commitment to knowledge, education and the proposition that 'childhood is the
season of the mind's possibilities.) To arrange our meeting- I wanted to discuss a matter oftranslation - I
telephoned him.
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Free at Last
Julian Pefanis
I met the philosopher a few years ago when he was director of
the College of Philosophy. (A significant detail that underlines
his commitment to knowledge, education and the proposition
that ~childhood is the season of the mind's possibilities.) To
arrange our meeting- I wanted to discuss a matter of translation
- I telephoned him.
'When would it be convenient for us to meet, Professor
Lyotard?' I inquired.

'Well, when would you like to meet me?' he replied. Of
course any·time was OK for me. Mter all, I was a research student
living in Paris, and on a daily basis the most exciting thing in my
life happened in the library at the Maison des sciences de lnomme.
That is, not m"uch. Certainly nothing I wouldn't drop for the
chance of meeting a living philosophe.
~ny time that suits you, Professor' I repeated. I mean surely;

Jean-Fran~ois,

you are a busy man much in demand.

'But what suits you' he countered. By this I was completely
foxed. Who was I to demand his time? But rather than end this
banal predicament with an appropriate statement like '9:30 on
Tuesday,' I somehow managed to make things worse:
'Professor Lyotard, any time suits me. After all, I am freer
than you are.'
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Ouch. After a momentary delay which allows me to reflect
on my communication skills - in the silence of a hissing white
noise _. he replies:
~re

you sure?)

Am I sure I am freer than Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard? The
bottom falls out of my stomach as the realisation sinks in: here I
am telling a French philosopher - someone who has fought for,
militated for, studied and breathed freedom - that, in some way,
he is not free!

I finally deal with my emharrassment and we duly meet
and discuss his ... Etonomie Libidinalewhich I was studying with
an eye to translating. 'How could you translate that? It's all
polemics.'
Well, yes it is polemical, "but it also marks a profound point
of rupture between politics in the modernist and postmodernist
eras. In this book it wasn't a matter of the collapse of the
metanarratives of legitimation, that is, a collapse of belief in the
goals of the Enlightenment. That sounds a bit like an
epistemological or religious issue. No, here it was a matter of a
failure ofethics in the machineries ofMarxism and Freudianism.
It's also true that he doesn't put much in the pla-ee of the
discredited theory..::Fhis has to wait untilh:is';~Kantian turn. It's
more of a confessional: throughout all the excoriation of tht;·,
machines he acknowledges his own libidinal investments.
was not a philosopher shy of using the word love.

He

258

Free at Last

Strange intensities: those English peasants weren't forced
offthe land into the factories; they voted with their feet to escape
the centuries of idiocy of rural existence. They embraced the
chance to work like mules in the mines, to drink themselves into
a stupour in pubs. Theywe1comed the opportunity to get fucked
by capital, to be in the hell of production. Furthermore they
weren't waiting around to be liberated by someone less content
with the world than they were, to be told that they colluded with
Capital to make their own lives a misery. They didn't want to be
saved from their strange affection for the prostitution of
capitalism.
It was a simple message to revolutionary politics: beware
of those who will capitalise desire on behalf of the oppressed;
treat people as ends in themselves and not as a means to an end.
And it has more than a passing reference. -to a categorical
imperative, which is of course precisely where Lyotard was
heading, having discovered a radically ethical moment in Kant.
With Kant it was necessary to rescue him from the neo-Kantians
and to celebrate that moment of indeterminacy when the whole
edifice imploded: the sublime. Here was something that linked
the moment of revolutionary politics - the suspension of
authority, the making of rules in the absence of rules - with the
moment of modernist aesthetics.
So I read the formulations in the Postmodern Condition
and ~swer to the question: what is the Postmodernt with respect
and interest. You will recall that to be postmodern, and thus
modern, the work had to question its status in relation to what
had gone before it (what particular trope was it displacing), it
had to examine its own unpresentable rules of presentation, and
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it had to self-reflexively answer the question: is it, that is, this
work of art here and now, is it happening?
To be reductive, it seems that there are at least two issues
with this approach to the question of the aesthetic: the first is
that it is slightly prescriptive; that modernism/postmodernism
was somehow a matter ofdefinition and not a matter of practices
that did indeed cause definitions to be constantly revised. And
secondly, there is a heavy unconscious formalism being played
out in the prescription.
And I asked myself: what exactly was wrong with the work
of the transavantgarde and the neo-expressionists who come in
for a heavy serve from Lyotard? Well, for a start, their work was
bound up with money. Living artists were actually going to banks
and depositing money in accounts. Is it axiomatic that artists
have to live in penury and garrets? It was, in those famous words.,
the realism of the Anything goes, the realism of money: But
Lyotard himsdfhad defended the very commodity system when
he asked on another occasion, what in the end is wrong with the
commodity system? Don't some very good things appear in the
form ofcommodities (including one must add, books on critical
philosophy) ?
There is also the matter of artists pursuing careers in mass
conformism. Granted we expect some originality from artists.
but do we really expect them to be above, or so very differenti.
from everybody-else in a societ}) most of whom do Jive Hves~~f
mass conformity?· Isn't this expectation one of the constrain"
imposed by modernism? Be ahead of the rest, be different! And
out of this difference repeat the system of values that you dahrl

260

Free at Last

to abhor, where every difference is a bad one, between the proper
and impropeT'~ the propriety and impropriety examined in such
depth in deconstruction,' and something like the differend
between Lyotard and Lacoue-Labarthe.' It is a prejudice, with a
minor collapsing of categories, that repeats the non-equation
between the avant-garde and kitsch postulated by critical theory
and high formalism - even though Lyotard specifically disavows
this.
What did Lyotard make of popular sensibility that shows
a marked preference and taste for the monstrous: the violent, the
lewd, the pornographic, the terroristic, the horrific and the
unauthentic (which is how one might characterise our cultural
world)? Why does he prescribe an aesthetic that is dearly not in
tune with the times - since all of these aesthetic categories are
emphatically the sublime's excluded conceptual objects? It got
me thinking that the contemporary aesthetic is not that of the
sublime, but of the monstrous.
In 'Frankenstein with Kant: A theory of Monstrosity or
the Monstrosity ofTheory/ Barbara Freeman argues that, between
them, Kant's Third Critique and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein
'predict the form of contemporary theory which Derrida had
called, when he brought the so-called French plague to America
in the 60s, the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming itself in
the terrifying form of monstrosity).
Certainly there are fortuitous coincidences between The
Third Critique and Frankenstein, between Immanuel Kant and
Victor Frankenstein. In the end, Victor mirrors Kant)s
metaphysical desire to preserve the sublime for the faculty of
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reason while refusing to accept paternity foi:' its negativities
(monstrosity, superstition, terror, passion, fanaticism). Kant's
sublime always falls short of allowing one to lose one's head in
feelings: the faculty ofreason is the arbiter of feelings. Victor too,
was the creator ofa monster he refuses to acknowledge, and who,
by virtue of this rejection and his deafness to the monster's sweet
voice, was ultimately destroyed because he didn't have a heart.
And thus a certain act of neglect is installed at the interior of the
speculative machinery right form the start.
Maybe it's true that the .monster issuing from what Avital
Ronell would call a bizarre. Moonie wedding of Kant a.nd
Frankenstein, of philosophy and romanticism, is contemporary,
paraliterary, deconstructive theory. Instrumental reason and the
mastery of nature, mastery of humankind are legitimated in this
union. Lyorard understood this and, at a certain cost to himself,
pointed to this monstrosity in Marx and capitalism, in the death
camps and Heidegger - and in a way took on the burden· of
philosophy's guilt (no doubt bequeathed by Adorno) and carried
out a working through, a talking cure of exculpating the
ineradicable stains of the fathers. And thus, despite minor
differends or maybe because of them; someone whose memory
we must cherish.

262

